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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a well settled principle of law that one must demonstrate the 
deprivation of a federally protected right, whether it be a constitutional or 
federal statutory right,2 to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 In 
the land use context, plaintiffs generally bring section 1983 claims based 
on the deprivation of the constitutional right to receive substantive due 
process.4 This article reviews and explores the implications of the Third 
Circuit’s recent decision in United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. 
Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003), which proposes a 
deviation from the judicial standard applicable to establish the 
deprivation of substantive due process for a section 1983 claim in the 
context of land use challenges. The proposed “shocks the conscience” 
standard, with its genesis in non-deliberative governmental contexts, may 
prove difficult to apply in the traditional land use setting. 
II. UNITED ARTISTS AND THE STANDARD TO ESTABLISH DEPRIVATION OF 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
A. The Established Standard 
Until United Artists, the Third Circuit’s test to establish the 
deprivation of substantive due process in the land use context was well 
settled; the plaintiff need only demonstrate that the municipal land 
decision was “arbitrary, irrational, or tainted by improper motive.”5 The 
                                                                                                             
 2 Not all claims of constitutional and federal statute violations are actionable under a 
section 1983 claim. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) 
(holding that the Constitution’s supremacy clause does not create actionable rights 
enforceable under section 1983); see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) 
(holding that federal statutes are not actionable under a section 1983 claim unless the 
federal statute creates an enforceable right.). 
 3 The United States Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil rights statute, 
on April 20, 1871 to act as a guardian of people’s federal rights, and thus protect people 
from unconstitutional action under color of state law, whether the action is executive, 
legislative, or judicial. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); see also Richardson 
v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997); Dist. of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). 
Essentially, section 1983 creates a private right of action to seek redress for the 
deprivation of federal rights. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. 225. 
 4 This constitutional right arises from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In pertinent part, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 5 Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988) (seminal case); see also 
Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Nicholas v. 
Pennsylvania State University, 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2000)) (recognizing “improper 
motives” as valid due process test); Woodwind Estates Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118 
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Third Circuit based this test on the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was “intended to 
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of 
government.”6 In applying this test, the Third Circuit routinely vacated 
the issuance of summary judgments “where the evidence at least 
plausibly showed that a government took actions against the developer 
for indefensible reasons unrelated to the merits of the zoning dispute.”7 
For example, in Bello v. Walker, the plaintiffs obtained the 
municipality’s approval for their five-stage subdivision building plan.8 
After receiving building permits for and completing stage one of the 
plan, the plaintiffs submitted an application to the municipality’s code 
enforcement officer (the “Official”) by which they requested the issuance 
of building permits to allow them to commence construction of stage five 
of the plan.9 The Official, however, denied the plaintiffs’ application, 
alleging that it was improper because the plaintiffs sought to construct 
stage five of the plan prior to the construction of stages two through 
four.10 The Official asserted this as the basis of his decision despite the 
fact that the plaintiffs had never agreed to develop the plan in numerical 
order.11 
In response, the plaintiffs filed a section 1983 action against the 
municipality and the Official (collectively, the “Defendants”) claiming 
that, inter alia, the deprivation of substantive due process because a 
number of municipal officials improperly influenced the Defendants’ 
decision to deny the building permits.12 Thereafter, the Defendants filed, 
and the district court granted, a motion for summary judgment.13 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, 
holding that substantive due process is violated where the denial of a 
building permit is based upon arbitrary, irrational or improperly 
motivated governmental action, such as a deliberate indifference to the 
                                                                                                             
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that § 1983 claim for deprivation of substantive due process is 
established where the denial of a development plan was “made in bad faith or was based 
on improper motive.”). 
 6 Bello, 840 F.2d at 1128 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)); see 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (holding that 
the Due Process Clause provides the “right to be free of arbitrary or irrational zoning 
actions.”). 
 7 Woodwind Estates, Ltd., 205 F.3d at 124. 
 8 Bello, 840 F.2d at 1126. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 1127. 
 13 Id. 
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law.14 Specifically, the court stated that the plaintiffs presented sufficient 
evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that certain 
municipality council members “improperly interfered with the process by 
which the municipality issued building permits, and that they did so for 
partisan political or personal reasons unrelated to the merits of the 
application for permits.”15 The court concluded that “[t]hese actions can 
have no relationship to any legitimate governmental objective, and 
[accordingly], are sufficient to establish a substantive due process 
violation actionable under § 1983.”16 
B. The United Artists Standard 
In its recent decision in United Artists, the Third Circuit appeared to 
stray from the established “arbitrary or improper motive” test by 
applying a new, more stringent “shocks the conscience” test.17 
1. An Analysis of United Artists 
In United Artists, a movie theater owner and developer (“United 
Artists”), attempting to develop a movie theater in an area that could 
only support one theater, filed a section 1983 claim with the district court 
against Warrington Township (the “Township”) and the Warrington 
Township Board of Supervisors in both their official and personal 
capacities (the “Supervisors”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) alleging 
that the Defendants violated the Due Process Clause by intentionally 
delaying the development approval process in order to obtain an impact 
fee offered by a competing movie theater developer (“Regal Cinema”).18 
To establish its claim, United Artists provided evidence demonstrating 
that: (1) the Township attempted to unlawfully change the terms of its 
approval of United Artists’ preliminary development plan which forced 
United Artists to file suit in the Court of Common Pleas to have the 
unlawful condition stricken and (2) the Supervisors took fourteen months 
to approve the United Artists’ preliminary development plan, tabling its 
vote on three separate occasions because United Artists refused to pay an 
impact fee, while only taking one month to approve the Regal Cinema 
                                                                                                             
 14 Id. at 1129. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 1129-30. 
 17 United Artists Theatre Circuit v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 400 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
 18 Id. at 396. 
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preliminary development plan, a plan offered by a developer willing to 
pay the impact fee.19 
In response, the Supervisors asserted qualified immunity defenses 
and moved for summary judgment.20 The district court denied the 
Supervisors’ motion with respect to the substantive due process claim 
and an appeal to a panel of the Third Circuit followed.21 The panel 
vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case instructing the 
district court to analyze each of the Supervisors’ qualified immunity 
defenses individually. In a footnote, the panel stated that it was 
expressing no opinion at that time as to whether a recent Supreme Court 
decision, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), required 
United Artists to establish that the Supervisors’ conduct “shocked the 
conscience” to demonstrate the deprivation of substantive due process in 
the land use context.22 
On remand, and after individually analyzing each of the 
Supervisors’ qualified immunity defenses, the district court again denied 
the Supervisors’ motion for summary judgment.23 Additionally, the 
district court responded to the panel’s reference to the “shock the 
conscience” test stating that “the shocks the conscience and arbitrary or 
improper motive tests are essentially the same.”24 The district court 
further noted that a recent Third Circuit opinion, Woodwind Estates, Ltd. 
v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000), suggested that Lewis did not 
alter the well established “arbitrary or improper motive” test.25 
Thereafter, the Supervisors again appealed to the Third Circuit.26 
The Third Circuit, in a two-to-one decision authored by the 
Honorable Samuel A. Alito,27 remanded the case to the district court, 
holding that Lewis superseded the “arbitrary or improper motive” test 
and that prior to its determination of whether the Supervisors may assert 
qualified immunity defenses, the district court must determine whether 
United Artists had alleged the deprivation of substantive due process 
                                                                                                             
 19 Id. at 395. 
 20 Id. at 396. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. (citing Woodwind Estates, Ltd., 205 F.3d at 118 (Sloviter, Roth and Cowen, 
JJ.)); see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). 
 26 United Artists, 316 F.3d at 396. 
 27 The United Artists panel consisted of the Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Robert E. 
Cowen and Alan D. Lourie. Judge Louire, a Circuit Judge for the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation, joined Judge Alito in the decision 
and Judge Cowen dissented. 
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under the new “shocks the conscience” test.28 The court stated that Lewis 
mandated the application of the “shocks the conscience” test by holding 
that executive action violates substantive due process “only when it ‘can 
properly be characterized as . . . conscience shocking, in a constitutional 
sense.’”29 The court further ratified the Lewis Court’s position that “only 
the most egregious official conduct” violates the “shocks the conscience 
test.”30 
The court rejected the district court’s argument that the “arbitrary or 
improper motive” and “shocks the conscience” tests were essentially the 
same, stating that “shocks the conscience” test encompasses only “the 
most egregious conduct” while the term “improper” sweeps much more 
broadly. Additionally, the court rejected the district court’s position that, 
in Woodwind Estates, the Third Circuit held that Lewis had not altered 
prior Third Circuit law.31 The court reasoned that because Woodwind 
Estates makes no mention of Lewis, the fact that it applied the “arbitrary 
or improper motive” test cannot alone establish the Third Circuit’s 
rejection of Lewis in the land use context.32 
The court concluded that the determination of whether conduct 
“shocks the conscience” will depend on the facts of the particular case 
because “deliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not 
be so patently egregious in another.”33 
2. An Analysis of the Rationale Underlying United Artists 
a. The Unique Circumstances in Lewis 
The United Artists court concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
opinion set forth in Lewis provided the basis for its decision to replace 
the “arbitrary or improper motive” test with the “shocks the conscience” 
test in the land use context.34 Specifically, the United Artists court stated 
that “[the] cases [applying the “arbitrary or improper motive” test] . . . 
cannot be reconciled with Lewis’s explanation of substantive due process 
analysis.”35 Accordingly, it is prudent to analyze the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 28 United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400. 
 29 Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850). 
 30 Id. at 399-400. 
 31 Id. at 400. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 399 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850). 
 34 United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400. 
 35 Id. 
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Court’s decision in Lewis36 to understand the rationale behind the 
adoption of the “shocks the conscience” test. 
Lewis, in fact, involved very different circumstances of alleged 
municipal improprieties. In Lewis, the U.S. Supreme Court “granted 
certiorari . . . to resolve a conflict among the Circuits over the standard 
of culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating due 
process in a pursuit case.”37 Specifically, Lewis involved a section 1983 
claim by which the parents of a decedent alleged that a police officer 
unconstitutionally deprived the deceased’s substantive due process right 
to life as the result of a high speed police chase.38 The U.S. Supreme 
Court examined the appropriate standard to apply to allegations that an 
executive branch official violated substantive due process and 
determined that the fundamental principle of due process was “protection 
against arbitrary action.”39 
The Court stated that “only the most egregious official conduct can 
be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’”40 The Court 
considered the “arbitrary or improper motive” test in the context of a 
“deliberate indifference” and found the term “deliberate indifference” an 
inappropriate concept in the context of a situation where actual 
deliberation was not practical, such as where a municipal official was 
found to make a split-second decision while chasing another vehicle.41 
The Lewis Court, under these circumstances, concluded that “the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by 
executive action only where it is ‘conscience shocking in a constitutional 
sense.’”42 
b. The Extension of the Lewis Standard in United Artists 
The Third Circuit’s extension of the Lewis “shocks the conscience” 
test to the land use context is potentially far reaching and, at least in the 
opinion of Judge Cowen’s ardent dissent, unwarranted. The majority 
opinion in United Artists expressed its conclusion that it is appropriate to 
apply the same culpable standard applied to an executive official in 
exigent circumstances where the official could not deliberate to 
                                                                                                             
 36 Opinion by Souter, J., in which Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy, Breyer and 
Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Scalia, J., 
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined. 
 37 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 839. 
 38 Id. at 837. 
 39 Id. (quoting Wolff v. Mc Donnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). 
 40 Id. at 846 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)). 
 41 Id. at 851 n.11. 
 42 Id. at 847 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 128). 
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situations where, after consideration, an executive official has issued a 
calculated and deliberate decision, stating “[o]n the merits, we hold that 
Lewis has superseded prior decisions of our Court holding that a plaintiff 
asserting that a municipal land-use decision violated substantive due 
process need only show that the municipal officials acted with an 
‘improper motive.’”43 
The extension of the “shocks the conscience” test may actually be 
inconsistent with the carefully worded limitations noted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Lewis.44 Indeed, the Lewis Court expressly stated: 
“[t]he issue in this case is whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process by causing death 
through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed 
automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender.”45 In 
reaching its decision, the Lewis Court carefully pointed out that although 
the “shocks the conscience” test is appropriate for situations where the 
state actor does not have time to deliberate, the deliberative indifference 
(“arbitrary or improper motive”) test is “sensibly employed . . . when 
actual deliberation is practical.”46 Furthermore, the Lewis Court’s 
application of the “shocks the conscience” test to exigent situations, 
where deliberation was not practical, was consistent with Third Circuit 
precedent, which also applied the “shocks the conscience” test to exigent 
situations while applying the “arbitrary or improper motive” test to the 
land use context.47 
The United Artists court’s expansion of the application of the 
“shocks the conscience” test to the land use context was inconsistent 
with not only Third Circuit precedent prior to Lewis but also to Third 
Circuit decisions rendered subsequent to Lewis, which not only 
acknowledged Lewis, but appeared to harmonize the two standards. In 
Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State University, a post-Lewis Third Circuit 
decision, Judge Alito, the same judge who subsequently authored the 
United Artists decision, authored a unanimous decision by which the 
Third Circuit concluded that the “arbitrary or improper motive” and 
“shocks the conscience” tests are appropriate substantive due process 
                                                                                                             
 43 United Artists, 316 F.3d at 394. 
 44 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 851 (emphasis added). 
 47 Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 953, at *13-17 
(3d Cir. 2003) (applying the “shocks the conscience” test where a state actor had to act 
with urgency); see Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988) (recognizing the 
“improper motive” test as valid Due Process standard in the land use context). 
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tests.48 Further, in Khodara, Judge Alito again authored a unanimous 
decision by which the Third Circuit49 expressly acknowledged Lewis and 
concluded that the “arbitrary or improper motive” test was the proper 
standard to determine a substantive due process violation in the land use 
context.50 In Woodwind Estates, a case also decided after Lewis, the 
Third Circuit concluded that the “arbitrary or improper motive” test was 
the proper standard to determine the deprivation of substantive due 
process in the land use context.51 
Given the limiting language in Lewis, and the Third Circuit’s initial 
recognition that distinct standards were appropriate based on whether the 
governmental actor had time to deliberate, Judge Cowen’s strongly 
worded dissent is not surprising. Judge Cowen, anticipating the inherent 
difficulty in applying the “shocks the conscience” test in the land use 
context, noted: 
[T]ossing every substantive Due Process egg into the nebulous 
and highly subjective “shocks the conscience” basket is unwise. 
It leaves the door ajar for intentional and flagrant abuses of 
authority by those who hold the sacred trust of local public office 
to go unchecked. “Shocks the conscience” is a useful standard in 
high speed police misconduct cases which tend to stir out 
emotions and yield immediate reaction. But it is less appropriate, 
and does not translate well, to the more mundane world of local 
land use decisions, where lifeless property (as opposed to bodily 
invasions) are involved. In this regard, it appears rather difficult 
to analogize the intentional and illegal denial of a building permit 
to the forced pumping of the human stomach, the infamous fact 
pattern that begat “shocks the conscience” as a term of 
constitutional significance.52 
Judge Cowen further warned: 
[Applying the “shocks the conscience” test in the land use 
context] is the jurisprudential equivalent of a square peg in a 
                                                                                                             
 48 See Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 2000). The Nicholas panel 
consisted of Judges Alito, McKee and Fullam. Judge Fullam, a Senior Judge of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was sitting by 
designation. 
 49 In addition to Judge Alito, the Khodara panel consisted of Judges Stapleton and 
Pollack. Judge Pollack, a Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, was sitting by designation. 
 50 Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 51 Woodwind Estates Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 124 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 52 United Artists Theatre Circuit v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 406-
07 (3d Cir. 2003) (Cowen, J. dissenting). 
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round hole. Yet, under the Majority opinion, it is with this 
awkward analogy that our district courts will now struggle. The 
confusion and potential for disparate results across the districts 
will haunt us for years to come.53 
A post-United Artists district court opinion further highlights the 
difficulty in applying the “police chase” standard in the land use context. 
In Levin v. Upper Makefield Tp., the court stated that “Lewis addressed 
the substantive due process culpability of a law enforcement officer [in 
exigent circumstances which resulted in death] and therefore could 
conceivably be distinguishable from other species of substantive due 
process claims,” such as in the land use context.54 In fact, in Fuentes v. 
Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 2000), a post-Lewis decision, the Third 
Circuit acknowledged this distinction, stating that the “shocks the 
conscience” test “may only apply” to law enforcement officers in exigent 
circumstances because “[t]he [Lewis] Court’s analysis of the police 
[chase] clarifies that the “shocks the conscience” standard of culpability 
applies in those instances where the police officer must instantaneously 
respond to a situation without opportunity for reflection on his or her 
actions.” 55 
3. The Third Circuit’s Inconsistent Application 
The Levin court pointed out the difficulty in applying the “shocks 
the conscience” test in the land use context, stating: “[w]e are only 
guided by rough contours” because “the Supreme Court has not provided 
a precise formula for determining what actions specifically constitute 
conscience shocking behavior.”56 As a result of the difficultly in applying 
this somewhat vague standard, courts within the Third Circuit have 
reached inconsistent decisions of what is conscience shocking. 
For example, in some applications of the test, the district courts 
have concluded that situations which typically constituted a “deliberate 
indifference” constitute “conscience shocking” conduct.57 In Nicolette v. 
                                                                                                             
 53 Id. 
 54 Levin v. Upper Makefield Township, 2003 WL 21652301 at *5 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 
2003). 
 55 Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 348 (3d Cir. 2000) (Mansman, Greenberg and 
McKee, JJ.) (emphasis added) (concluding that the “shocks the conscience” test applies 
in a prison riot situation because, similar to the police chase in Lewis, the officers have no 
time to deliberate). 
 56 Levin, 2003 WL 21652301 at *8. 
 57 See Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F. Supp. 2d 710, 715 (W.D. Pa. 2003); see also The 
Development Group, LLC v. Franklin Township Board of Supervisors, 2003 WL 
22358440 at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
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Caruso, the court concluded that the plaintiff satisfied the “shocks the 
conscience” test where the plaintiff alleged that the township officials 
engaged in a course of conduct designed to restrict plaintiff from 
developing his property.58 
The plaintiff in Nicolette was the owner of a business that disposed 
of construction and demolition waste. After the plaintiff discontinued 
waste disposal in the township, township officials allegedly embarked on 
a “retaliatory campaign of unrelenting harassment and abuse,” by 
selectively enforcing regulations against the plaintiff and arbitrarily 
denying his plans to construct a parking facility, golf driving range and 
recycling facility.59 The plaintiff claimed to have spent thousands of 
dollars in attempting to comply with the township’s requests regarding 
the projects.60 The court accepted, for purposes of summary judgment, 
that the township officials had engaged in a “course of conduct designed 
to restrict plaintiff from developing the property he leased,” which 
sufficiently implicated the “shocks the conscience” test.61 
Similarly, in The Development Group, the district court concluded 
that the plaintiffs satisfied the “shocks the conscience” test on a motion 
to dismiss where they pled that “Defendants gave contradictory 
indications about what kind of submission would be approved, attempted 
to persuade Plaintiffs to withdraw the submissions through unlawful 
means, and caused Plaintiffs to incur great expense in revising the 
plans.”62 
However, in other applications of the test, courts in the Third 
Circuit have upheld a more restrictive standard that appears to lessen the 
protection that individuals had against arbitrary government conduct 
under the “arbitrary or improper motive” test.63 For instance, in Levin, 
the district court found that: (1) the township intentionally delayed the 
issuance of a final building permit to the plaintiff, even after the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on the township’s appeals; 
(2) the township’s act of cashing plaintiff’s permit fee before issuance of 
any of the permits was “dubious”; and (3) that the township officials’ 
proposed ordinance was drafted with the sole intent of restricting the 
plaintiff from building on his property.64 Although this conduct likely 
                                                                                                             
 58 Nicolette, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 723. 
 59 Id. at 715. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 723. 
 62 The Development Group, LLC, 2003 WL 22358440 at *6. 
 63 Levin, 2003 WL 21652301 at *8; Corneal v. Jackson Township, 313 F. Supp. 2d 
457, 465-67 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
 64 Levin, 2003 WL 21652301 at *9. 
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would have satisfied the “arbitrary or improper motive” test, the court 
held that it was insufficient to satisfy the “shocks the conscience” test.65 
The court summarily concluded that “[t]his chain of events strongly 
points to a bad motive and purposeful intention to delay issuing the 
Plaintiff a building permit, but it does not foster a finding that 
Defendants’ behavior shocked-the-conscience.”66 
Another district court applied a similarly harsh standard in Corneal, 
concluding that “the totality of the facts, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the [plaintiffs], establishes that the Board may have acted 
with [improper] motives . . . related to illegitimate personal animus. This 
is not enough to establish a violation of substantive due process [under 
the new standard].”67 
C. Applicable Land Use Review Standards in Other Circuits 
Given the inconsistency within the Third Circuit of the “shocks the 
conscience” test, the impact of the new test remains uncertain. Some 
guidance is provided in reviewing decisions in other circuits, although 
the majority of circuits continue to apply the “arbitrary or improper 
motive” test. Only two other circuits have adopted the “shocks the 
conscience” test and, of these two, one circuit’s application appears to 
gravitate toward the “arbitrary or improper motive” test. 
1. Most Circuits Continue to Apply the “Arbitrary or Improper 
Motive” Test 
After the Supreme Court’s issuance of Lewis, it appears that most 
circuits have concluded that Lewis does not mandate the application of 
the “shocks the conscience” test in the land use context. For example, 
prior to Lewis, the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the “shocks the 
conscience” test in the land use context, stating: 
Not only are there fewer instances in case law, but the “shock the 
conscience” test is not as uniformly applied to cases where 
excessive force or physical brutality is not the basis of the claim. 
The “shocks the conscience” standard, fuzzy under the best of 
circumstances, becomes fuzzy beyond a court’s power to 
interpret objectively where there is a dearth of previous decisions 
on which to base the standard. We doubt the utility of such a 
standard outside the realm of physical abuse, an area in which the 
                                                                                                             
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Corneal v. Jackson Township, 313 F. Supp. 2d 457, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
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consciences of judges are shocked with some degree of 
uniformity.68 
After Lewis, the Sixth Circuit continued to apply the “arbitrary or 
improper motive” test, concluding that “citizens have a substantive due 
process right not to be subjected to arbitrary or irrational zoning 
decisions.”69 
Similarly, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and D.C. Circuits have 
apparently concluded that Lewis does not mandate the application of the 
“shocks the conscience” test in the land use context because each of 
these circuits issued decisions subsequent to Lewis by which each 
refrained from applying the “shocks the conscience” test in the land use 
context. For example, to determine the deprivation of substantive due 
process in the land use context subsequent to Lewis, the Fourth Circuit 
applied an “arbitrary and irrational” test;70 the Fifth Circuit applied an 
“arbitrary or capricious” test;71 the Seventh Circuit applied an “arbitrary 
and unreasonable” test;72 the Tenth Circuit concluded that if there was a 
property interest, the claim was ripe and not subsumed within the 
Takings Clause, an “arbitrary” test would apply;73 and the D.C. Circuit 
has defined the substantive due process test as “grave unfairness” or 
“egregious government misconduct,” not conscience shocking.74 
                                                                                                             
 68 Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 69 Tri-Corp Mgmt. Co. v. Praznik, 33 Fed. Appx. 742, 747 (6th Cir. 2002); see also 
Bowers v. City of Flint, 325 F.3d 758, 763 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the “arbitrary 
or improper motive” test is the appropriate standard in the land use context because it 
“[i]s simply another formulation” of the “traditional ‘shocks the conscience’” test). 
 70 Tri-County Paving, Inc. v. Ashe County, 281 F.3d 430, 440 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 71 Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris County, 236 F.3d 240, 253 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 72 Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 73 Signature Props. Int’l Ltd. P’ship v. City of Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th 
Cir. 2002). 
 74 George Washington Univ. v. Dist. of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (concluding that the “substantial infringement of state law prompted by personal or 
group animus” constitutes a substantive due process violation). 
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2. A Minority of Circuits Apply the “Shocks the Conscience” Test75 
Only the First, Second and Third Circuits hold that the “shocks the 
conscience” test is the appropriate standard to determine a section 1983 
violation in the land use context.76 However, of these three circuits, only 
the Second and Third Circuits replaced their respective “arbitrary or 
improper motive” tests with the “shocks the conscience” test after 
concluding that Lewis mandated the application of the “shocks the 
conscience” test.77 The First Circuit, on the other hand, applied the 
“shocks the conscience” test as early as 1982, well before Lewis.78 
Indeed, in 1988, ten years prior to Lewis, while deciding the appropriate 
test to determine the deprivation of substantive due process in the land 
use context, the Third Circuit considered and rejected the First Circuit’s 
                                                                                                             
 75 The Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have not been included as either circuits 
that apply or refuse to apply the “shocks the conscience” test for the following two 
reasons. First, it is unclear which test the Eighth Circuit applies because it has not 
expressly adopted the “shocks the conscience” test and in a recent case has concluded 
that, under Lewis, it is appropriate to apply the deliberate indifference (“arbitrary or 
improper motive”) test to non-exigent situations where the state actor had time to 
deliberate. Terrell v. Larson, 371 F.3d 418, 425 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying the deliberate 
indifference standard where a police officer had time to deliberate before acting). 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently granted a rehearing en 
banc and vacated the Terrell opinion. Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2005). 
Second, neither the Ninth or Eleventh Circuits reach the application of the standard. The 
Ninth Circuit does not reach the application of the standard because, in the Ninth Circuit, 
claims for substantive due process violations are barred by the Graham Doctrine which 
provides that a plaintiff cannot assert substantive due process claims instead of, or in 
addition to, takings claims. Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 1997). 
The Eleventh Circuit does not reach the standard because it recently concluded that 
“constitutional due process is satisfied … when proper procedures are employed.”  
Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mt. Brook, City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003). 
Note that prior to this decision, the Eleventh Circuit had traditionally applied the 
“arbitrary or improper motive” test to substantive due process claims. Greenbriar Ltd. v. 
City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 76 Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 (1st Cir. 1982); 
Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999); United Artists Theatre 
Circuit v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 77 Compare United Artists, 316 F.3d at 400 (expressly following Lewis in applying 
the “shocks the conscience” test which overruled Third Circuit precedent that previously 
applied the “arbitrary or improper motive” test), and Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 
F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1999) (expressly following Lewis by overruling Second Circuit 
precedent that previously applied an “arbitrary or irrational” test), with Southview Assoc., 
Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992) (pre-Lewis precedent by which the Second 
Circuit applied the “arbitrary or improper motive” test). 
 78 Estabrook, 680 F.2d at 832. 
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“shocks the conscience” test and concluded that the “arbitrary or 
improper motive” test was the appropriate test in the land use context.79 
3. The First and Second Circuits’ Inconsistent Application of the 
“Shocks the Conscience” Test 
Similar to the Third Circuit’s inconsistent application of the 
“shocks the conscience” test, the First and Second Circuits have 
inconsistently applied the test because the First Circuit’s application 
creates a more stringent standard while the Second Circuit’s application 
parallels the “arbitrary or improper motive” test. 
Consistent with the Third Circuit’s decisions in Corneal and Levin, 
the First Circuit took a very stringent approach that appears to lessen the 
protection that individuals have against arbitrary government conduct.80 
Indeed, despite the fact that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
the Due Process Clause was intended to secure individuals from the 
arbitrary exercise of state action, the First Circuit concluded that even if 
the state action is arbitrary, there is no violation unless the conduct is 
“shocking or violative of universal standards of decency.”81 
For example, in Collins, the First Circuit expressly concluded that 
regardless of whether state action may have been arbitrary, there is no 
violation of substantive due process in the land use context unless the 
conduct is “truly horrendous.”82 The Collins court concluded that 
evidence that a zoning board member’s rejection of the plaintiff’s 
application was motivated by personal animus did not constitute 
“conscience-shocking” behavior and thus, was not a violation of 
substantive due process.83 
The First Circuit has consistently applied this stringent standard. 
For instance, the First Circuit concluded that the denial of an application 
for approval of a development plan in contravention of state statute;84 the 
                                                                                                             
 79 Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988); see DeMutis v. Borough of 
Phoenixville, 1990 WL 96100 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (acknowledging that “[t]he court in Bello 
did not follow the approach of the First Circuit.”). 
 80 Compare Estabrook, 680 F.2d at 832, and Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 349-50 
(1st Cir. 1994), and Nestor Colon Medina & Successors, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 
45 (1st Cir. 1992), and PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir. 
1991), with Levin v. Upper Makefield Township, 2003 WL 21652301 at *8 n.15 (E.D. 
Pa. 2003), and Corneal v. Jackson Township, 313 F. Supp. 2d 457, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
 81 Collins v. Nuzzo, 244 F.3d 246, 250-51 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Amsden v. 
Moran, 904 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982). 
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revocation of a special permit out of animus toward the plaintiff;85 the 
denial of a permit in retaliation for plaintiff’s political views86 and the 
denial of an application for approval of construction drawings in 
violation of agency regulations87 do not constitute conscience shocking 
behavior. 
Unlike the First Circuit and similar to the Third Circuit’s decisions 
in Nicolette and Development Group, a district court in the Second 
Circuit concluded that situations which typically constitute arbitrary or 
improperly motivated conduct constitute “conscience shocking” 
conduct.88 For example, the Second Circuit concluded that, under the 
“shocks the conscience” test, the plaintiffs stated a claim for the 
deprivation of substantive due process where the plaintiffs alleged that 
the denial of the permit was improperly motivated.89 
In T.S. Haulers, the plaintiff purchased unimproved property in an 
industrially zoned district.90 The plaintiffs applied for a special permit to 
operate a non-nuisance industry, which would allow them to operate a 
sand mining facility.91 The town denied the permit allegedly under 
“political pressure from various civil and environmental associations that 
are opposed to sand mining.”92 The plaintiffs then obtained a permit from 
the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, which 
allegedly foreclosed the town’s ability to deny the use of the land for 
mining.93 In response, the town amended its Code to prohibit sand 
mining in the area in which the plaintiffs’ property was located.94 In 
ruling on the town’s motion to dismiss, the district court found that 
because the town denied the plaintiffs’ application for a special permit 
due to political pressure from environmental and conservation groups 
and amended its Code to specifically exclude the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs 
                                                                                                             
 85 Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 349-50 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 86 Nestor Colon Medina & Successors, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 
1992). 
 87 PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 88 Compare T.S. Haulers, Inc. v. Town of Riverhead, 190 F. Supp. 2d 455 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002), with Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F. Supp. 2d 710, 715 (W.D. Pa. 2003), and The 
Development Group, LLC v. Franklin Township Board of Supervisors, 2003 WL 
22358440 at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
 89 See T.S. Haulers, 190 F. Supp. 2d 455. 
 90 Id. at 456-57. 
 91 Id. at 457. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
2005] CONSCIENCE SHOCKING TEST 117 
had alleged a denial of substantive due process sufficient to withstand the 
motion to dismiss.95 
III. CONCLUSION 
The rationale set forth in United Artists may lend itself to critical 
reevaluation because, as the dissenting opinion suggested, land use 
decisions are deliberate in nature and not issued in exigent circumstances 
such as the police chase discussed in Lewis. Furthermore, given the 
varying results of the application of the “shocks the conscience” test, one 
is unable to determine whether the “shocks the conscience” test is, as 
Nicolette, Development Group and a district court in the Second Circuit 
suggest, simply a dressed-up “arbitrary or improper motive” test or, as 
Levin, Corneal and the First Circuit suggest, a more stringent test 
affording less protection against arbitrary government action.96 
If the “shocks the conscience” test is construed to create a more 
stringent test, permitting arbitrary government conduct to proceed 
unchecked unless the conduct is deemed “conscience shocking,” the new 
test may be challenged as being inconsistent with the historically stated 
principles of substantive due process protection. The U.S. Supreme Court 
said that, “[h]istorically, this guarantee of due process has been applied 
to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of 
life, liberty, or property.”97 The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that the “[the Due Process Clause] was intended to secure individuals 
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.”98 Indeed, in 
Lewis, the Court stressed the intent of the Due Process Clause when 
determining to apply the “shocks the conscience” test in the police-chase 
context, stating that “[s]ince the time of our early explanations of due 
process, we have understood the core of the concept to be protection 
against arbitrary action.”99 Clearly, a deliberate decision indifferent to 
the law by a governmental official sworn to uphold the law should 
constitute “an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government” and thus 
violate the Due Process Clause regardless of the fact that it may not be 
                                                                                                             
95 Id. at 462. 
96 Compare Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F. Supp. 2d 710, 722-23 (W.D. Pa. 2003), and The 
Development Group, LLC v. Franklin Township Board of Supervisors, 2003 WL 
22358440 at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2003), with Levin v. Upper Makefield Township, 2003 WL 
21652301 at *8 (E.D. Pa. 2003), and Corneal v. Jackson Township, 313 F. Supp. 2d 457, 
468 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
97 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (emphasis added). 
98 Id. at 331 (emphasis added). 
99 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (emphasis added). 
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“conscience shocking” because people have become desensitized to 
corrupt and/or arbitrary government action.100 
The ultimate application of United Artists and its “shocks the 
conscience” test likely will remain uncertain until the Third Circuit or the 
U.S. Supreme Court provide clarification by determining that: (1) the 
extension of the “shocks the conscious” standard in the land use context 
was inappropriate given the vastly differing circumstances surrounding 
police chases and land use development deliberations; (2) the “shocks the 
conscience” test in the land use context is nothing more than a 
heightened “arbitrary or improper motive” test; or (3) the “shocks the 
conscience test” is a more stringent test which can also be reconciled 
with the historic principles of substantive due process protection. 
Until such a clarification is provided, either through expressed legal 
standards or a case-by-case analysis of various factual circumstances, the 
courts likely will struggle with determining exactly what federal 
protections are afforded to property owners and land developers from 
arbitrary government conduct. 
                                                                                                             
100 The potential vagueness of the standard also may create vastly different standards 
within the same region, because what “shocks the conscience” in one municipality may 
be considered routine behavior in another. Ironically, the more nefarious a government’s 
reputation, the more immune it may be from challenge. 
